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ARTICLE

EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE'S
USE OF ROMAN AND CANON LAW:

A

STUDY IN THE SUPREME COURT'S USE
OF FOREIGN LEGAL CITATIONS

DR. CHARLES J. REID, JR.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has been engaged in an increasingly
fractious debate for the last several terms over the role foreign legal sources
should play in decisions in which the foreign sources do not control the
outcome of a particular case. This debate might be said to have received
critical impetus in the 2002 decision of Atkins v. Virginia. 1 In that case,
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority, argued that subjecting
the mildly mentally retarded to the death penalty violated evolving standards of decency as reflected not only in legislative and judicial action
among the fifty states but as found in the law of the "world community."2
This statement drew a rebuke from Justice Antonin Scalia. The legal norms
of the "world community," Justice Scalia wrote, "[are] irrelevant."3 The
world community's "notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of
our people.,,4
This debate has replicated itself, in more heated terms, in succeeding
Supreme Court terms. In 2003's Lawrence v. Texas,S the Supreme Court's
majority opinion, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, made use of recent European developments in justifying the Court's judgment that Texas's
prohibition on sodomy was unconstitutional:

* Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas. I gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of Professors Ed Edmonds, and Robert Delahunty. I also acknowledge and thank Daniel Ehrlich and Kimberly Heglund for their fine research assistance. Tricia
Kemp's outstanding library skills are also gratefully acknowledged.
1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. Id. at 316 n. 21.
3. Id. at 347--48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 316 n. 21).
4. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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The European Court of Human Rights ... [and] [o]ther nations,
too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct . . . . The right the petitioners seek in this case has
been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other
countries. 6
Again, Antonin Scalia raised his voice in spirited protest. Kennedy's
majority opinion was selective in its choice of foreign law, Scalia asserted,
disregarding "the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions
on sodomy."7 More fundamentally, however, the use of foreign sources of
law to decide a case of this sort is "meaningless dicta" and "[d]angerous
dicta, . . . since 'this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or
fashions on Americans.'''8
The 2004/2005 term witnessed the same combatants doing battle over
the same issue of the relevancy of foreign law, this time in the context of a
case that challenged the constitutionality of state laws authorizing the trial
of juveniles for capital crimes. 9 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
looked to "Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, which every country in the world has ratified save for the United
States and Somalia."l0 Kennedy also considered amici briefs submitted by
European Union and the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England
and WalesY He concluded, "It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty
"12

Justice Scalia heaped scorn on this pattern of reasoning: "The Court
... proclaims itself sole arbiter of our Nation's moral standards-and in the
course of discharging that awesome responsibility purports to take guidance
from the views of foreign courts and legislatures."13 "[T]he basic premise
of the Court's argument-that American law should conform to the laws of
the rest of the world-ought to be rejected out of hand."14 Indeed, Scalia
noted, the Court's majority did not really believe this proposition to be
6. ld. at 576-77.
7. ld. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. /d. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n. * (2002)
(Thomas, J., concurring». In a second case dating to the 2003 term, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003), Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg made use of international sources of law in her concurrence justifying race-based affirmative action programs: ''The Court's observation that race-conscious programs 'must have a logical end point' ... accords with the international understanding
of the office of affirmative action." ld. at 344 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring) (citing id. at
342). Justice Ginsburg went on to consider the "International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination," of which the United States is a signatory. ld.
9. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
10. ld. at 575.
11. ld.
12. /d. at 578.
13. ld. at 578 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. ld. at 608.
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true. 15 If it did, it would act to modify the nation's abortion laws to conform
to international standards. 16
The justices have not only waged this battle in the course of their opinions; they have chosen various public fora to engage one another. In 2002,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor lauded the new globalized world in which we
find ourselvesY In this new context, the law of other nations should be
given greater recognition: "Although international law and the law of other
nations are rarely binding upon our decisions in U.S. courts, conclusions
reached by other countries ... should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts. This is sometimes called 'transjudicialism."'18
The next year, addressing the same audience, Justice Stephen Breyer
advanced similar claims. 19 The law of other nations, Breyer asserted, can be
usefully consulted for the lessons that might thereby be imparted: "[W]e
find an increasing number of issues, including constitutional issues, where
the decisions of foreign courts help by offering points of comparison."20
Ultimately, Breyer waxed enthusiastically, we all share almost universally
held aspirations for peace, prosperity, and freedom, which might be advanced through "judicial institutions."21 "The force of this aspiration,"
Breyer continued, "I hope and believe, is virtually irresistible."22
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, has asserted the paramount values of
representative democracy and a concomitant judicial modesty and respect
for the popular wilL In a speech delivered at the Gregorian University in
Rome, in 1996, Scalia announced his support for "dogmatic democracy."23
"The whole theory of democracy," Scalia asserted, "is that the majority
rules."24 As a judge, Scalia has considered himself to be bound by this
simple dictum. It is the premise upon which he has grounded both his commitment to an originalist interpretation of the United States Constitution
and his analysis of statutes. 25 It is also the premise that governs his rejection
15. Id.
16. Id. at 625 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("And let us not forget the Court's abortion jurispru-

dence, which makes us one of only six countries that allow abortion on demand until the point of
viability.").
17. Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address, 96 Am. Socy. IntI. L. Proceedings 348, 349
(2002).
18. ld. at 350.
19. Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 Am. Socy. IntI. L. Proceedings 265 (2003).
20. !d. at 266.
21. Id. at 267.
22. Id.
23. Antonin Scalia, Of Democracy, Morality, and the Majority, in 26 Origins 82, 88 (June
27, 1996).
24. ld.
25. Scalia's commitment to "textualism"-which holds that statutes must be interpreted only
in terms of their objectively understandable language to the exclusion of considerations of legislative intent--reflects his larger commitment to democracy. In his typically pungent manner, Justice
Scalia explained: "It is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with
fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than
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of foreign law as a legitimate source for American judicial reasoning. Indeed, for Scalia, the use of foreign law as persuasive authority squarely
implicates the very legitimacy of the judicial system. 26
I do not aspire in this paper to resolve this controversy. Rather, my
intention is to shed some indirect light on the debate through an analysis of
the uses to which Roman and Canon Law were put by Chief Justice Edward
White, who served on the United States Supreme Court from the 1890s to
the early 1920s. The contemporary debate over foreign law's relevancy,
after all, is nothing more or less than a debate over the proper sources of
law for judicial decision making. The nature of this debate, therefore,
makes past Supreme Court practice at the very least a useful guidepost and
point of comparison.
And few American Supreme Court justices were more original in their
use of legal sources than Edward Douglass White. Appointed associate justice in 1894 and elevated to the position of Chief Justice in 1910, White was
unique among American justices in being a Louisiana lawyer and trained
civilian. Unlike his contemporaries-and unlike nearly all who have served
on the Supreme Court-White was conversant, as a matter of training and
practice, in the language and sources of Roman and canonical jurisprudence, broadly understood as embracing not only the law of ancient Rome
but also the living systems of the European Continent. 27 This paper is concerned with the ways in which he drew upon that learning to demonstrate
the universality of the rule for which he is arguing.

II.

ROMAN AND CANON LAW AND THE UNIVERSALITY OF LEGAL
EXPERIENCE IN THE OPINIONS OF EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE

This article makes several commonplace assumptions about judicial
opinions. First, it is assumed that a judicial opinion is intended by its author
as a statement regarding the law and facts necessary to the resolution of the
case. This is not to say that there is only one right resolution or that judges
cannot disagree. It is entirely possible-indeed, inevitable-that some cases
lend themselves to more than one possible outcome and that judges can and
by what the lawgiver promulgated. That seems to me one step worse than the trick the emperor
Nero was said to engage in: posting edicts high up on the pillars, so that they could not easily be
read." Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal
Courts and the Law 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton U. Press 1997) (quoted in Caleb Nelson,
What Is Textualism? 91 Va. L. Rev. 347, 352 n. 13 (2005)).
26. Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle: Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance through Global Government Networks, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1255, 1307 (2005) (citing a foreign case as persuasive authority rather than as mere rhetorical flourish raises the deep issue of
legitimacy).
27. One can find a quick summary of this expansive meaning of Roman law, and its impact
over two millenia of European legal development, in Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr.,
Roman Law in Europe and the Jus Commune: A Historical Overview with Emphasis on the New
Legal Science of the Sixteenth Century, 20 Syracuse J. IntI. L. & Com. I, 1 (1994).
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do have reasonable, good-faith disagreements over their proper resolution.
All that is meant by this assumption is that judges find it necessary to explain themselves by means of written opinions and that they must justify
themselves by citing to and discussing relevant law and fact.
It is further assumed, as a corollary to the first assumption, that opinions are intended to be persuasive. Every contested case, after all, necessarily features at least two alternative readings of the law and facts. In light of
this consideration, opinions must be persuasive to a variety of audiences.
They must persuade, first of all, the opinion's author as well at least some
portion of the other members of the court. But opinions should also be persuasive to the court's readership. Ideally, litigants and their lawyers will
leave the courthouse, if not satisfied with the outcome, at least convinced
that the court did its best to arrive at a reasonable outcome. Furthermore,
the practicing bar should also come away convinced that the court has arrived at an intellectually satisfying defense of its judgment. Policymakers
and other educated and interested readers should be able to reach similar
conclusions. This is so even where a judge is a lonely dissenter. Indeed, a
judge dissenting from established legal doctrine might have so abandoned
hope in persuading fellow justices that he or she is writing only in the hope
of persuading a future generation of the rightness of the cause. But-the
rejoinder follows-posterity, too, is a proper audience for a judge.
It is assumed, finally, that judges are interested in employing a certain
economy in their writing. It is an unusual judge who would admit that he or
she has included in an opinion material that is neither necessary nor useful
to the case's resolution. While judges might distinguish between dicta and
holding in the writings of other courts, they will seldom admit that portions
of their own opinions should count only as mere dicta-surplusage that
their readers would do well to disregard.
These considerations and assumptions are useful to keep in mind when
approaching the use of Canon and Roman law by a judge like Edward
Douglass White. They keep us focused on the task at hand-understanding
the functions that his repeated references to these ancient sources of foreign
law were intended to have. We proceed with the working assumptions that
White was not engaged in mere window dressing, adornment, or spectacle,
but that he really intended to produce functional, useful opinions that relied
on the relevant facts and law and that were persuasive to the various audiences described above.
Although Chief Justice White used citations to Roman and Canon law
for several distinct purposes,28 this paper considers his invocations of these
sources as a means of demonstrating the universality of the rule for which
28. In a forthcoming book, I will explore Justice White's additional uses of Roman and
Canon law. He invoked them as a sort of rhetorical device, and as sources of particular legal rules.
He also cited Roman and Canon law to support arguments for law reform.
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White is arguing. In the three cases I discuss below, White is challenging
his readers to consider the broad universe of legal experience and the various forms of legal reasoning found in other nations and contexts. In short,
he is attempting to give his conclusions a certain air of inevitability-millennia of legal history point in the direction White has chosen and it thus
makes sense to follow this inevitable course.
These cases m·e significant also because White not only uses Roman
law rhetorically, to demonstrate the universality of a pmticular rule, but
because he actually derived governing principles of law from Roman and
canonical sources. Indeed, at points where American case law stands
against the desired outcome-provided the interests are sufficiently largeWhite will adopt and adapt the principles of a foreign legal system to the
problem that has presented itself.
An investigation of White's opinions has implications for understanding the prevailing jurisprudence of the United States of one hundred years
ago. By jurisprudence, of course, is meant an era's predominant understanding of how to answer the question, "What is law?" American jurists today
would answer this question very differently than they would have a century
ago.
A.

Coffin v. United States29

Coffin v. United States involved a prosecution for bank fraud. Among
other grounds for appeal, petitioner-defendants asserted that their convictions should be reversed because the lower court failed to instruct the jury
on the presumption of innocence that the defendants enjoyed, even though
the court had instructed the jury that they should convict only if satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants were guilty. 3D An instruction
on reasonable doubt, the petitioners essentially argued, was no substitute for
reminding the jury that they should not look upon the defendants as guilty
men. Writing for the Court, the young Associate Justice White held in favor
of petitioners and commenced his treatment of the subject of presumption
of innocence with a broadly-worded principle: "The principle that there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law,
axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminallaw."31
Taken as an axiom, understood as a foundation stone of criminal justice, the presumption of innocence, as articulated by White, needed no further justification in logic. Axioms, after all, are by definition the starting
points of reasoning and cannot themselves be further justified.
29. 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
30. Id. at 452-53.
31. Id. at 453.
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White nevertheless felt the need to justify his broad assertion on behalf
of the presumption of innocence not by some further syllogism but by an
examination of its antiquity and universality. And the means he chose for
this exercise was, first of all, a searching examination of the texts of the
classical and postcIassical Roman law and of medieval Canon law.
At least five texts of Roman law, White asserted, stood in favor of the
presumption of innocence. His first text, a decree issued jointly by the emperors Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius, and dated to the year 382,
instructed those who sought to bring criminal charges not to do so unless
their accusations could be supported by suitable witnesses, the clearest form
of documentation, or "undoubted evidence clearer than light."32 White followed this text with a passage from Justinian's Digest indicating that it was
the Emperor Trajan's wish, expressed to one of his representatives, that no
one should be condemned in his absence, for "it was better that the crime of
a culprit remain unpunished than that an innocent person be condemned."33
White followed these passages with three maxims of law drawn from
the final book of Justinian's Digest. "Always in doubtful matters," the first
maxim asserted, "the kinder interpretation should be preferred."34 "In criminal matters," the second maxim averred, "the more mild interpretation is to
be observed. "35 A final maxim asserted: "In a doubtful matter it is no less
just than it is safe to follow the more generous interpretation."36
None of these passages exactly added up to a presumption of innocence. The first text, the late fourth-century imperial decree, was nothing
more than an admonition that one who brings a criminal accusation must
ensure that the evidence he is about to present is convincing. It could as
easily have supported the respondents' claim that an instruction on reasonable doubt, standing alone, was entirely sufficient even in the absence of
32. Codex 4.19.25 (Gratian, Valentian & Theodos). White cites this text at Coffin, 156 U.S.
at 454. His citation contains a slight error, citing to title twenty of book four of the Codex instead
of title 19. I have furnished my own translation of the text, as opposed to Justice White's.
33. Digest 48.19.5 (Ulpian). Again, the translation is my own. White cites this text at Coffin,
156 U.S. at 454.
34. Digest 50.17.56 (Gaius). The Latin is highly abbreviated and reads: "Semper in dubiis
benigniora praeferenda sunt." White proposed translating the passage: "In all cases of doubt, the
most merciful construction of facts should be preferred." Coffin, 156 U.S. at 454. The word
benigniora-"more benign"-might embrace the concept of mercy, but it might just as easily
embrace the concepts of "expansiveness" or "generosity." I have used the word "kinder" to relate
its meaning. White also narrows the meaning of the maxim when he speaks of "construction of
, facts." In fact, the maxim makes no mention of facts; the word elubUs can best be translated as
"doubtful matters." The studied breadth and ambiguity of the maxim, indeed, suggests rather that
it is equally applicable to interpretations of law as well, as facts.
35. Digest 50.17.155.2 (Paulus). Again, I have used my own translation. See Coffin, 156 U.S.
at 454, for White's, which differs slightly from my own.
36. Digest 50.17.192.1 (Marcellus). I have here translated the phrase benigniorem intel'pl'etationem "more generous interpretation," although the word "kinder," which I have previously used
for benigniol'em, would also work well here. See supra n. 34. Again, I have differed from White's
rendering of the passage. See Coffin, 156 U.S. at 454.
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anything to further a presumption of innocence. Trajan's instructionWhite's second text--might be read as simple mistrust of his subordinates:
better that a guilty person go free than his subordinates convict someone
wrongly. Its meaning might be extended to encompass a general concern
for the truthfulness of the proceedings but, again, it is not a general presumption of innocence. The same can be said for the maxims of law that
White cites. The first and third maxims were written in general terms and
might embrace both civil and criminal proceedings. The second maxim, admonishing that the "more mild interpretation be observed" in criminal matters, did not by its terms embrace a presumption of innocence. It might as
easily be read as counseling that a lesser penalty be imposed on a guilty
party where the law so allowed. White's own citations, in other words,
could be seen as supporting his endorsement of a presumption of innocence
in only a most general manner.
White next considered a late Roman literary text and a text of medieval Canon law. Ammianus Marcellinus, the Roman source to which White
turned, was a late fourth-century man of letters from the eastern half of the
empire, who wrote a history intended to tell the story of Rome from the
death of the emperor Nerva (96 CE) to the year 378. Only the last part of
this work survives, which recounts the period between the years 351 and
378. 37 A pagan in a world that was becoming increasingly Christian, Ammianus put considerable distance between himself and the new religion,
professing fear that regimes that immersed themselves too much in religion
could come to naught. 38 Rome remained for Ammianus the Eternal City,
the repository of traditional (pre-Christian) virtue and the hope for the future liberty of humankind. 39 In assuming a stance of this sort, Ammianus
was probably the last Roman writer able to adopt an historiographical
stance that exalted the glorious pagan days of old Rome at the neglect of its
transformation into a central home of the new Christian faith.
In particular, Ammianus celebrated the life of the Emperor Julian
(reigned 361-363).40 Julian, the "flawed hero" of Ammianus's work,41
37. A valuable guide to Ammianus's life is the essay by Arnaldo Momigliano, The Lonely
Historian Ammianus Marcellinus, reprinted in Arnaldo Momigliano, Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography 127 (Wesleyan U. Press 1977). For purposes of this article, I have consulted
the three-volume Loeb Classical Library edition. See Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum
Libri Qui Supersunt (John C. Rolfe ed. & trans., Harvard U. Press 1950).
38. E.D. Hunt, Christians and Christianity in Ammianus Marcellinus, 35 Classical L.Q. 186
(1985).
39. John Matthews, Ammianus and the Eternity of Rome in The Inheritance of Historiography, 350-900, at 17 (Christopher Holdsworth & T.P. Wiseman eds., Exeter U. Publications 1986).
40. John Matthews, The Roman Empire of Ammianus 465, 468-69 (Johns Hopkins U. Press
1989).
41. Hunt, supra n. 38, at 187. Another scholar, noting the emphasis that Ammianus placed on
Julian's virtuous qualities is less reserved than Hunt in characterizing Julian. According to R.C.
Blockley, Julian was the "ideal emperor." See R.C. Blockley, Ammianus Marcellinus: A Study of
His Historiography and Political Thought 73-103 (Latomus 1975). Blockley concludes: "Ammi-
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came to the imperial throne after half a century of Christian rule. He repudiated the Christian practices of his immediate predecessors and set about
reconstructing the ancient pagan glories of Rome, although this enterprise
was cut short by Julian's death on military campaign in Persia.
White's reliance on Ammianus demonstrates the lengths to which he
would go to universalize the presumption of innocence. As White picks up
the story, the year is 359 and Julian had just become "Caesar" of the Western empire but had not yet consolidated all imperial power in his hands. 42
Temporarily headquartered in Gaul, Julian sought to administer fair-minded
justice to all within his rule. 43 Numerius, the former governor of Gaul, had
been accused of official misconduct and had denied the charge. 44 His accuser, Delphidius, declared, "Can anyone, most mighty Caesar, ever be
found guilty, [if denial suffices for acquittal]?,,45 Julian "wisely" answered,
"Can anyone be proved innocent, if it be enough to have accused him 7"46
It is in this passage, drawn from a pagan panegyric celebrating the
virtues of an emperor known as "the Apostate" in Christian sources, that
White came closest to identifying a real presumption of innocence at work
in ancient Rome. 47 White, a classically trained Catholic, undoubtedly knew
this history and relished the chance to find support for the proposition he
was defending even in source material seemingly hostile to his faith-all
the better to establish the universal truth of the presumption of innocence.·
White's reference to a medieval canonistic source, however, contains
an inexplicable error that, fortunately, made no difference to the case White
was arguing. Misattributing a text of Pope Innocent III (which was found in
Pope Gregory IX's Liber Extra, to Gratian's Decretum, and published half a
century before Innocent lived and worked), White was nevertheless able to
identify an important source for his claims in favor of a presumption of
innocence. 48 Pope Innocent wrote that one suspected of heresy should not
be condemned on the basis of presuppositions and groundless assumptions,
anus did not set out to compose a panegyric upon Julian. If he seems to have produced one, it is
because he honestly thought that the Emperor approached his ideal." ld. at 102.
42. Coffin, 156 U.S. at 491.
43. Marcellinus, supra n. 37, at vol. I, bk. XVIII, 402-05.
44. ld. at 404-05.
45. ld. (" 'Ecquis, florentissime Caesar, nocens esse poterit usquam, si negare sufficiet?"').
46. ld. ('''Ecquis' ait 'innocens esse poterit, si accusasse sufficiet?"').
47. Coffin, 156 U.S. at 460-61.
48. X. 2.23.14. Gratian's Decretum is among the most mysterious of all medieval legal texts.
We are not certain who Gratian was and its date of publication has been fixed at 1140 on the basis
of circumstantial evidence, although even this date has not gone unchallenged. The most recent
book-length assessment of Gratian's work is Anders Winroth, The Making of Gratian's Decretum
(Cambridge U. Press 2000). The Liber Extra, promulgated by Pope Gregory IX in 1234, was an
official collection of papal decretal letters, issued for the most part in the ninety or so years that
had passed since the appearance of Gratian's Decretum. See James A. Brundage, Medieval Canon
Law 53-55 (Longman Group Ltd. 1995). White cites this canonical text in Coffin, 156 U.S. at
455.
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but only on the basis of real evidence. 49 Once again, White's source does
not exactly support a presumption of innocence. But the primary purpose of
the text-condemning misplaced reliance on presumptions of guilt instead
of engaging in a real search for evidence-provided ample support for
White's larger argument that we should presume the innocence of those
accused but not convicted of criminal wrongdoing.
Roman and Canon law were not the only foreign sources that White
consulted. He read and cited widely among the sources of the English common law as well to justify the outcome in Coffin. 50 But reliance on the
common law is an expected analytical move by a Supreme Court justice.
The American legal system is, after all, derived from the common-law system of Great Britain and still relies on the common law for an understanding of basic terms and concepts. It was thus not through his use of the
common law, but through his use of the Roman and Canon law that White
demonstrated the universality of the position for which he was arguing.
This is not to say that White's treatment was unproblematic. Understood as an historical excursus into the presumption of innocence, White's
efforts clearly came up short. His texts can be said to support a general
notion of due process, a sense of procedural fairness, and a general humanity in the application of legal norms to civil and criminal defendants. They
do not, however, support the supposed antiquity of the presumption of innocence. Indeed, except for the passage from Ammianus Marcellinus, White's
sources demonstrate precisely the opposite, revealing the absence of a
clearly articulated presumption of innocence in the ancient and medieval
world. But White's work was not primarily an historical inquiry. He was
not seeking to provide a fastidiously accurate account of the ancient law, to
contextualize it, or to understand its precise boundaries. Rather, White was
engaged in a creative use of historical precedents and foreign law to justify
the enshrinement of an essentially new presumption in the constitutional
law of the United States. 51
White was taken to task by some of his contemporaries for his analysis
of the presumption of innocence. Two years later, in the Storrs Lectures
delivered at Yale Law School, James Bradley Thayer declared that White's
opinion in Coffin had "sadly misimproved" the law of evidence through its
articulation of a presumption of innocence. 52 The Coffin Court's effort to
distinguish between the reasonable doubt evidentiary standard and the pre49. X. 2.23.14.
50. 156 U.S. at 455-56.
51. White comes close to acknowledging that this was his intention in the following passage:
"While Rome and the medievalists taught that, wherever doubt existed in a criminal case, acquittal
must follow, the expounders ofthe common law, in their devotion to human liberty and individual
rights, traced this doctrine of doubt to its true origin, the presumption of innocence, and rested it
upon this enduring basis." Id. at 460.
52. James Bradley Thayer, The Presumption of Innocence in Criminal Cases, 6 Yale L.J.
185, 185 (1897).
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sumption of innocence so as to make both elements a part of due process of
law Thayer criticized as confusing. 53 Thayer also criticized White's understanding of the history of the presumption of innocence, although he said
nothing about White's use of Roman and canonical citations to support his
conclusions. 54
In recent decades, on the other hand, both courts and commentators
have come to appreciate the significance of Coffin v. United States as an
important step in the development of a robust presumption of innocence in
American constitutional law. Citing and quoting from Coffin v. United
States, the United States Supreme Court in In re Winship declared '''axiomatic and elementary'" the presumption of innocence. 55 The absence of
this presumption, the Winship Court noted, would result in fundamentally
unfair and constitutionally infirm proceedings.56 Six years later, in Estelle v.
Williams, the Supreme Court again quoted the "axiomatic and elementary"
language of Coffin v. United States to defend the requirement of the presumption of innocence as "a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice."57 As recently as the 2005 term, in Deck v.
Missouri, Justice White's language in Coffin was quoted to reverse a conviction where the defendant appeared shackled in the courtroom during the
sentencing phase of his capital trial. 58 Even though the Court conceded that,
strictly speaking, the defendant was no longer entitled to a presumption of
innocence since he had already been found guilty of a capital offense, the
related concern of "deciding between life and death" was still on the table. 59
"Accuracy in making that decision" was every bit as crucial as the initial
determination of guilt, and prosecutors were thus admonished to avoid the
appearance of prejudice. 60
Coffin v. United States has also figured in dissenting opinions of the
United States Supreme Court. Writing in dissent, John Paul Stevens reminded his brethren on the bench "that the presumption of innocence, when
uncontradicted, is an adequate substitute for affirmative evidence."61 For
support, he cited Coffin v. United States. 62 Indeed, Justice Thurgood Marshall even quoted from Ammianus Marcellinus when arguing for the presumption of innocence. 63
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

!d. at 209-11.
Id. at 206-07, 210.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (quoting Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453).
Id.
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, _ , 125 S. Ct. 2007, 2013 (2005).
Id. at 2014.
Id.
Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 283 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 764 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Commentators, too, have embraced Coffin v. United States. The case
has been understood as the means by which the positive law of the United
States integrated within itself the natural law tradition. 64 The Israeli scholar
Rinat Kitai cites Coffin as establishing the presumption of innocence as a
"fundamental principle of criminal procedure."65 William Laufer has noted
that the distinction that Coffin drew between the presumption of innocence
and the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof helped to reinforce
both principles. 66 Other commentators have seen Coffin v. United States as
the starting point for understanding the development of the presumption of
innocence as a fundamental postulate of criminal law. 67 Coffin, in other
words, represents a fundamental development in the history of American
notions of due process and criminal procedure.
It is worth making this point as clearly as possible because Coffin is
ultimately grounded not on a narrow positivistic understanding of constitutionallaw, but on an expansive understanding of the western legal tradition
and the larger constitutional principles that can be derived from two millennia of experience. Drawing from Roman legal texts and even from Roman
literary sources, combining and synthesizing this material with canonistic
sources and the historical common law, White articulated a principle that is
now taken for granted by American lawyers. It is a principle that did not
exist in clearly articulated form in American jurisprudence until 1895. And
it is a principle that has at its foundation not only the case law and precedents of the Anglo-American tradition, but the wisdom of the ages.

B.

Cubbins v. Mississippi River Commission68

Early explorers of the lower Mississippi River Valley documented its
recurrent floods. 69 An early twentieth-century historian of the Mississippi
identified the portion of the river that was prone to catastrophic flooding:
"The delta of the Mississippi River subject to overflow extends from Cape
Girardeau, forty-five miles above Cairo, to the Gulf of Mexico, nearly 600
miles in an air line, and varies in width from twenty to eighty miles. Its area
amounts to 29,790 square miles."70
64. Joseph C. CascareIli, The Presumption of Innocence and Natural Law: Machiavelli and
Aquinas, 41 Am. J. Juris. 229, 231 (1996).
65. Rinat Kitai, Protecting the Guilty, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 1163, 1164 (2003).
66. William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 329, 343 (1995).
67. See e.g. Damien P. DeLaney, Better to Let Ten Guilty Men Live: The Presumption of
Life-A Principle to Govern Capital Sentencing, 14 Cap. Def. J. 283, 285 (2002); John T. Rago,
"Truth or Consequences" and Post-Conviction DNA Testing: Have You Reached Your Verdict?
107 Dick. L. Rev. 845, 876 n. 8 (2003) ("The presumption of innocence was identified for the first
time in CoiJin v. United States.").
68. 241 U.S. 351 (1916).
69. Lyle Saxon, Father Mississippi 253 (The Century Co. 1927).
70. /d.
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It was this portion of the Mississippi River, extending from southern
Illinois and southern Missouri to the area south of New Orleans, that the
Mississippi River Commission was tasked with taming at its creation in
1879.71 Writing in 1930, an historian of this project described it as "probably ... the most important piece of flood-control legislation in all of our
history.'>72 As summarized in congressional hearings in 1916, the act creating the commission granted it capacious powers:
[The commission is to] take into consideration and mature such a
plan or plans and estimates as will correct, permanently locate,
and deepen the channel and protect the banks of the Mississippi
River, improve and give safety and ease to the navigation thereof,
prevent destructive floods and promote and facilitate commerce,
trade, and the postal service. 73
In practice, the Mississippi River Commission attempted to impose
some degree of coordination over the kind of haphazard flood control and
planning that had previously taken place on the lower Mississippi. 74 In fact,
even after the establishment of the commission, jurisdiction over flood control and the building of levees was shared between state and local authorities?5 States created levee districts that exercised the powers to tax, to issue
bonds, and to condemn property in accord with principles of eminent domain. 76 The Mississippi River Commission served as the central coordinating agency, to ensure that flood control was effective. 77
The constitutionality of this effort to control Mississippi River flooding was questioned by litigants in a pair of cases decided three years apart,
Jackson v. United States78 and Cubbins v. Mississippi River Commission. 79
Jackson commenced in 1894, asserting that flood control projects had rendered worthless for agricultural purposes several tracts of land comprising
three plantations in Adams County, Mississippi. 80 Plaintiffs sought to recover damages for the value of lost crops, personal property, and the consequent decline in market value of their real estate. 81 The case was brought
against the United States government on the theory that the congressional
71. Arthur DeWitt Frank, The Development of the Federal Program of Flood Control on the
Mississippi River 42 (Columbia U. Press 1930).
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting H.R. Comm. on Flood Control, Hearings 1916, at 8).
74. Flood control was desperately needed. A reference work on Mississippi flooding, published in 1928, documented extensive flooding in the lower Mississippi in 1897, 1903, and 1912.
See Lamar T. Beman, Flood Control 47 (The H.W. Wilson Co. 1928). Such flooding continued
even after the Cubbins case was decided.
75. Frank, supra n. 71, at 137.
76. Id.
77. Frank describes "[a] movement for Federal control on a larger scale" that took "[a] half
century" to accomplish. !d. at 157.
78. 230 U.S. 1 (1913).
79. 241 U.S. 351.
80. 230 U.S. at 6-7.
81. [d. at 8-9.
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authorization that stood behind the Mississippi River Commission and other
federal actors, like the Army Corps of Engineers, was responsible for depriving the litigants of the value of their lands and should therefore be liable
to make compensation. 82
Edward Douglass White, by now promoted to chief justice, wrote the
opinion for a unanimous court. A native of the region, his opinion bespeaks
a deep intimacy with the topography of the affected area, as he sketched
out, in exquisite detail, the various geologic features that characterized the
Mississippi River Valley from Cape Girardeau, Missouri, to the point where
the river merged its flow with the Gulf of Mexico. 83 White went on to reject
the plaintiffs' complaints. Indeed, he saw the plaintiffs' cause as little more
than special pleading deserving of no judicial protection. Citing and relying
on no legal precedent, White concluded:
When accurately fixed, the complaint is but this, that because the
claimants had built a levee for the purpose of protecting their
lands and which answered that purpose if levees were not built by
others to protect their lands, actionable injury would be occasioned claimants when anybody else sought to protect his land
from overflow, since to do so would increase the volume of water
in the river and raise the flood level to the detriment of
claimants. 84
White then used this assertion as the premise of his larger point: the
landowners by constructing levees on their lands had essentially claimed
the right to dictate to their neighbors what they mayor may not do on their
lands. 85 This line of reasoning, White concluded, was absurd; parties enjoyed the right to protect their own lands from flooding, especially where
such actions have been authorized by local laws. 86 White then took the further step of asserting that what private individuals could do for themselves,
the government-acting on behalf of the entire community-might undertake as a cooperative venture without thereby violating private rights. 87
82. [d. at 2-3. The plaintiff-plantation owners had previously constructed levees to protect
their farm land, but the integrity of these levees were apparently compromised by the new, more
comprehensive structures built by the Mississippi River Commission and the Army Corps of Engineers. [d. at 20-21.
83. [d. at 3-6.
84. [d. at 20-21. White continues:
In its essence, however, this but amounts to saying that because the claimants have built
a levee along their property for the purpose of protecting it from overflow in times of
high water, they have acquired the right to stereotype the conditions existing at the time
they built their levee even to the extent of preventing anyone from subsequently exerting
his right to build a levee to protect his land.
[d. at 21.
85. [d.
86. [d. at 21-22.
87. Would it be said that the claimants would have a resulting right of action in damages because other owners had exerted the very right which the claimants had previously resorted to for the purpose of protecting their own land? If not, upon what
imaginary ground can it be said that because a work which was lawful in and of itself,
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Thus, without citing a single case or statute, White disposed of the landowners' case through a series oflogically structured syllogisms demonstrating the right and responsibility of government to act on behalf of the
common good.
Three years later, a similar case was presented to the Court. In Cubbins
v. Mississippi River Commission, the plaintiff argued that the Mississippi
River Commission, directly and indirectly, through reliance on state building projects, caused to be erected a series of levees running the entire length
of the Mississippi River from Cape Girardeau to the Gulf of Mexico that
flooded his land and caused it to lose all market value. 88 The flooding
caused by the levee system had the effect, the plaintiff averred, of destroying the homes of his tenant farmers and filling good agricultural land with
silt and sand, thus making it worthless for the growing of crops.89 Further,
this was a violation of his legal rights "since he was entitled to the natural
flow of the river within its natural high or low water bed free from interference by the acts of the defendants."9o The plaintiff accordingly sought injunctive relief against the commission, seeking to prevent it "from further
building any levees, from enlarging, strengthening, repairing or doing any
act to maintain the levees already built and for general relief."91
White formulated a response to the plaintiff's cause of action by looking most immediately to Roman law. His transition to Roman law was so
abrupt as to be jarring. In a single paragraph intended to introduce the reasoning that was to follow, White asserted that the plaintiff's case deserved
"a negative answer" on the basis of Jackson v. United States and another
earlier case.92 In further support of this conclusion, White went on to state
that it was necessary to consider the case in two distinct aspects: "First,
with reference to the rights and obligations of the landowners and the power
of the state to deal with the subject; and second, with reference to the power
of the United States to erect levees to confine the water for the purpose of
improving navigation .... "93 White immediately followed this rather con~
ventional formulation of the case by stating:
Without seeking to state or embrace the whole field of Roman
law concerning the flow of water, whether surface or subterranean, or to trace the general differences between that law, if any,
was done by the United States, therefore responsibility in favor of the claimants was
entailed.
[d.

88. 241 U.S. at 359-60. The plaintiff's contention was that by preventing widespread flooding of alluvial plains, the levees increased the overall elevation of the river and that this elevation
of the river caused it to overtop the levees from time to time, to the detriment of plaintiff's land.
[d. at 362.
89. [d. at 360-61.
90. [d. at 361.
91. [d.
92. [d. at 362.
93. [d. at 363.
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as it existed in the ancient law of the continent of Europe whether
customary or written, or as it prevailed in France prior to, and
now exists in, the Code Napoleon, one thing may be taken as
beyond dispute, that not only under the Roman law, but under all
the others, the free flow of water in rivers was secured from undue interruption, and the respective riparian proprietors in consequence of their right to enjoy the same, were protected from
undue interference or burden created by obstructions to the flow,
by deflections in its course, or any other act limiting the right to
enjoy the flow, or causing additional burdens by changing it. 94
At first blush, the second quotation, when immediately following the
first, reads almost as a non sequitur. Without reference to any governing
statute, without even a nod in the direction of prevailing case law, White
introduced the subject of Roman law to furnish the relevant principles required for the proper resolution of the case. The second quotation, furthermore, seems to support a result favorable to the plaintiff. It was the
plaintiff, after all, who sought to secure the unimpeded flow of water by
means of his petition for injunctive relief.
White, however, continued:
But while this was universally true, a limitation to the rule was
also universally recognized by which individuals in case of accidental or extraordinary floods, were entitled to erect such works
as would protect them from the consequences of the flood by restraining the same, and that no other riparian owner was entitled
to complain of such action upon the ground of injury inflicted
thereby, because all, as the result of the accidental and extraordinary condition, were entitled to the enjoyment of the common
right to construct works for their own protection. 95
The adverb "universally," repeated twice in a single sentence in the
above-quoted passage, is the key to understanding White's invocation of
Roman law. He was engaged in the search of universally true legal principles and believed he might find them in Roman law. If it is always and
everywhere true that water should ordinarily be allowed to flow unimpeded,
then the exception to this rule is equally and universally true that one might
protect one's land from "accidental" or "extraordinary" flooding.
The Roman law to which White turned in Cubbins was not, in the first
instance, the ancient texts of Justinian, but the civilian jurisprudence of
France, especially the Code Napoleon and its systematic explication by
Charles Demolombe. 96 White began with Article 640 of the Code Napo94. Id.
95. Id. at 363-64.
96. To speak of the Code Napoleon is itself inexact. When most writers speak of the Code
Napoleon they mean by it the Code civil, enacted into law in 1804. In fact, this was "one of five
Napoleonic codes," the others being the Commercial Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Penal
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leon, especially as understood by Demolombe. 97 This provision of the Code
was concerned with the creation of "servitudes arising from the flow of
water."98
On its surface, Article 640 seemed precisely opposed to the outcome
White wished to achieve. In three sentences, it declared that "inferior
lands"-lands that might be downstream or on lower ground-were "compelled to receive" waters that flow naturally from higher ground to which
human handiwork has not "contributed."99 A second sentence specified that
the owner of the "inferior land" could not construct a barrier to impede such
flow.100 A third sentence added that the owner of higher ground could not
do anything to increase burdens on the proprietor of lower ground. The text
seemed clear: under penalty of law, private parties ought not to interfere
with the free and natural flow of water.
Demolombe's commentary, however, qualified this seemingly dogmatic rule. While landowners might not be permitted to divert the flow of a
river or deepen its bed or to violate in any manner the rights of other landowners, they nevertheless might be able to protect their own property from
"accidental and extraordinary" (accidentels et extraordinaires) flooding.IOI
White translated and quoted this text and followed it with a passage from
Justinian's Codex: 102 "Ripam suam adversus rapidi amnis impetum munire
prohibitum non est."103 White continued by translating and quoting
Demolombe at some length:
[E]ven when the effect of the dikes or other works done will be,
as is nearly always the case, to render the waters of the river more
hostile and damaging to other properties, the owners of which
Code, and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Andre Tunc, Methodology of the Civil Law in France,
50 Tul. L. Rev. 459, 460 (1976).
Charles Demolombe (1804-1888) was the author of a thirty-one-volume systematic study
and exposition of the Code Napolion. See Charles Demolombe, Cow's de Code Napolion vol.
1-31 (A. Lahure ed., Paris 1880-1882). A brief discussion of Demolombe's method can be found
in Vernon Valentine Palmer, From Embrace to Banishment: A Study of Judicial Equity in France,
47 Am. 1. Compo L. 277, 298 (1999).
97. Cubbins, 241 U.S. at 364.
98. !d.
99. C. civ. art. 640 ("proprietaire in/trieur ... assujettis ... a recevoil' ... naturellement,
sans que la main de 1'/1omme y ait cont/'ibue~').
100. ld.
101. Charles Demolombe, COUI'S de Code Napolion vol. 11, 34 (A. Lahure ed., Paris 1882).
102. Cubbins, 241 U.S. at 364. Translating from Demolombe, White wrote,
But the author at once proceeds to add that the principles thus stated [prohibiting proprietors from altering the flow or direction of rivers or streams] in no way serve to prevent
or to limit the right of proprietors whose lands border on or are traversed by rivers "from
[guaranteeing] themselves against damage by defensive works, constructed either upon
the border of the rivers or in the interior of their property, against either the permanent
and insensible action of the rivers or streams, or particularly against the damage caused
by the accidental or extraordinary overflow of their banks ...."
ld. (quoting Demolombe, supra n. 101, at 34).
103. "It is not prohibited to strengthen one's bank against the force of a rushing torrent." Code
Just. 7041.1 (Gordian 239) (translation by author).
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would have no cause of complaint because each one is entitled to
do the same in his own behalf, as the right of preservation and of
legitimate defense is reciprocal, since it is impossible to conceive
that the law would impose upon the proprietors bordering upon
streams an obligation to suffer their property to be devoured [by
accidental or extraordinary overflows] without the power on their
part to do anything to protect themselves against the disaster.104
White's source was thus employed to acknowledge that efforts to protect one's land will nearly always result in alterations of flow that would
have the effect of worsening the condition of someone else's property.
White did not, however, stop with this acknowledgement. What mattered
now was the establishment of proper limits for such a defense of one's
lands and rights. To discern these restrictions, White continued to consult,
to translate, and to quote from Demolombe. In this way he made Roman
law his principal source of guidance as he fashioned the parameters that
might be permissibly followed in constructing dams and levees for the protection of private property:
It is necessary, however, that the works constructed [for the purposes stated] do not encroach upon the natural bed of the water
courses, that they should be of course constructed in conformity
to the police regulations, if any exist, and finally that they are in
fact constructed by those who build them for the defense of their
own property, because constructions would not be tolerated which
had been erected by a proprietor upon his own land without any
necessity whatever for his own protection, but with the only and
disloyal purpose of injuring the property of others. lOS
White then drew from his reading of Demolombe a general rule: there
was, he asserted, a "general right to an unrestrained flow of rivers and
streams."106 This right, however, was "qualified by the limitation as to accidental and extraordinary floods."107 This rule, White continued, prevailed
not only in France, but in ancient Rome and in modern Scotland. 108
104. Cubbins, 241 U.S. at 364-65 (quoting Demolombe, supra n. 101, at 34.) "Et lors meme
que I' effet de ces travaux, plantations, digues ou autres, serait, comme il arrive presqne toujours,
de rendre les eaux plus hostiles et plus dommageables aux autres fonds, les proprietaires de ceuxci ne seraient pas fondes It se plaindre; car chacun peut en faire autant de son cote; ce droit de
preservation et de legitime defense est reciproque; et il etait impossible que la loi imposiit aux
proprietaires riverains des fleuves et des rivieres I' obligation de laisser devorer leurs fonds, sans
pouvoir rien faire pour les garantir!" Demolombe, supra n. 101, at 34.
105. Cubbins, 241 U.S. at 365 (quoting Demolombe, supra n. 101, at 34). "Ce qu'il faut
seulement, c'est que leurs travaux n'anticipent pas sur Ie lit naturel du cours d'eau; qu'ils soient
faits aussi, bien entendu, conformement aux reglements de police, s'il en existe, et enfin, qu'ils
aient en effet serieusement pour but la defense de leurs propres fonds car on ne devrait pas tolerer
des ouvrages qui auraien ete faits par un proprietaire, sans aucune necessite, su son propre fonds,
et dans la seule et deloyale intentio de nuire aux autres fonds." Demolombe, supra n. 101, at 34.
106. Cubbins, 241 U.S. at 366.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Only after this lengthy excursus through foreign sources did White arrive at the state of American case law, about which, he concluded, "much
contrariety and confusion exist[ed].,,109 But despite these problems with the
cases, White asserted, one can still discern within them support for the basic
proposition he had chosen to defend: that a landowner has the right to protect his property from the "accidental and extraordinary" flooding of an
adjacent river or stream. 110 The only question that remained, in White's
estimation, was whether the periodic flooding of the Mississippi qualified
as accidental or extraordinary. 111 Asserting that any flood necessarily depended on a series of coincidences as to place, time, and volume of water,
he concluded that the overflows to which the Mississippi was subject met
the legal standard he had derived from his reading of Demolombe's commentary.1l2 On this reading of the law, the state had every right, if not the
affirmative duty, to protectthe land from flooding.
Dissected in this manner, White's opinion appears breathtaking in the
scope of its reliance on foreign law. He derived the language and phrasing
of the legal standard he applied ("accidental and extraordinary") from a
French commentary on a French legal text. White's opinion, indeed, bespoke a practical disdain for American case law. The case law was dismissed as hopelessly confused. As an alternative to resolving this confusion
through a careful reading of the cases and a search for its binding principles,
White turned instead to French and Roman law. White went so far as to
borrow the method of the French lawyers. He did not rely principally upon
the text of the Code Napoleon, which was not terribly helpful;113 instead, he
chose to explicate Charles Demolombe's magisterial commentary on the
Code. Andre Tunc has written that "[i]t has often been remarked that the
common law is a judge-made law, whereas codified law is a law of law
teachers."1l4 White himself employed the method of a civilian in discussing
Demolombe at such great length and in ultimately deriving the rule of the
case from this commentary.
Why did White resort to civilian jurisprudence? The easy answer is
that it was familiar to him, that it was second nature, really, for him to take
such a step. But if one pressed this point further, one might discover that the
American case law, far from being confused, stood largely opposed to his
preferred outcome.
Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Company involved an
action brought in federal court for a violation of the Wisconsin state consti109. Id.
110. Id. at 366-67.
111. Id. at 367.
112. Id. at 367-68.
113. See supra n. 99 and accompanying text.
114. Tunc, supra n. 96, at 469.
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tution. 115 The plaintiff in Pumpeliy was a landowner whose property was
permanently flooded by a dam constructed across a river by a canal companyy6 Ascertaining that the Wisconsin constitutional provision was substantially identical to the federal constitution's authorization of eminent
domain,117 the United States Supreme Court determined that the permanent
flooding caused by defendant's dam amounted to a taking because it had
permanently lost all market value. 118 Since the dam had been constructed in
conformity with a state statute, the Court further determined that compensation was in orderY9
Pumpelly differed from Cubbins in some crucial respects. It was decided on the basis of state constitutional grounds. It involved land that was
permanently flooded. But the principle articulated by Pumpelly-that government was responsible to offer compensation where it destroyed a property's value as well as where it claimed actual ownership over it-seemed
broad enough to have included the Cubbins case within its reach.120 Courts
and commentators have continued to make much of Pumpelly' s broad statement of principle even today. The Supreme Court has continued to make
use of Pumpelly as a source for its takings jurisprudence. 121 Similarly, legal
scholars have continued to understand Pumpelly as an important starting
115. Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166, 166 (1871).
116. [d. at 177.
117. [d.
118. [d. at 179-80.
119. [d. The Pumpelly Court grounded its decision ultimately on the Wisconsin Constitution
and case law construing it, which was held to require the payment of compensation whenever a
public taking occurred. [d. at 180.
120. It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing a provision of
constitutional law, always understood to have been adopted for protection and security
to the rights of the individual as against the government, and which has received the
commendation of jurists, statesmen, and commentators as placing the just principles of
the common law on that subject beyond the power of ordinary legislation to change or
control them, it shall be held that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict
irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to a total destruction without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of that
word, it was not taken for the public use. Such a construction would pervert the constitutional provisions into a restriction upon the rights of the citizen, as those rights stood at
the common law, instead of the government, and make it an authority for the invasion of
private right under the pretext of the public good, which had no warrant in the law or
practices of our ancestors.
[d. at 177-78.
121. See e.g. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (looking to Pumpelly as early
support for the principle that "the Takings Clause requires compensation if the government authorizes a compelled physical invasion of the property." Id. at 527.); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (looking to Pumpelly as justifying
the holding that "the entire doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition that
a taking may occur without such formal proceedings [of condemnation]." [d. at 265.); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (In a case involving the introduction
of cable television lines in appellant's commercial real estate, the Court held, relying on Pumpelly,
that "a permanent physical occupation authorized by state law is a taking without regard to
whether the State, or instead a party authorized by the State, is the occupant." [d. at 432 n. 9.).
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point for modern takings-clause jurisprudence. Writing in the Columbia
Law Review, William Michael Treanor stated that Pumpelly "contained the
seeds of the reconceptualization of the Takings Clause that was to occur
subsequently, since it explicitly recognized that the harm suffered by
Pumpelly was a loss of 'value.' "122 David Currie noted that while Pumpelly
received little attention at the time, it was of great "significance for the
future. "123
Had the Cubbins Court so desired, Pumpelly might have proven to be
sound, controlling law in Cubbins. Barnette Moses, counsel for the plaintiff,
cited Pumpelly in his brief.124 Moses cited other cases that could also have
been used to build a powerful majority opinion favoring the landowners'
interests. "The construction of levees for reclamation of lands from overflow, although referable in a certain sense to the police power, is likewise
an exercise of the power of eminent domain, and the owner of property
taken for such purpose must be compensated therefor," Moses argued. 125
Moses supported this claim with an impressive array of case law. 126
White countered this claim, first, by distinguishing the facts in Cubbins: Cubbins did not involve the reclamation of lands from flooding, but
the protection of lands against flooding. This was yet another reason for
recourse to Demolombe. White had need for finely drawn distinctions and
Demolombe provided the sophisticated reasoning he needed to succeed.
Demolombe spoke of the freedom of landowners to build defensive bulwarks against accidental and extraordinary flooding. Clearly, in White's
mind, the levees were justified as constitutional for the protection of lands,
not reclamation. 127
122. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 796 n. 74 (1995). As if to underscore the importance of
Pumpelly to the Cubbins case, Treanor observed, "[Tlhe Pumpelly Court carefully limited its
holding to cases 'where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth,
sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually
destroy or impair its usefulness.'" [d. (quoting Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 181).
123. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Limitations on State Power,
1865-1873, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 329, 357 (1984).
124. Cubbins, 241 U.S. at 356 (argument for appellant).
125. 1d. at 353.
126. Two cases cited by Moses appeared especially strong authority for his contention: Head
v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885) (upholding a New Hampshire state "mill act," which
permitted the erection of dams on non-navigable streams provided adequate compensation was
paid to affected land owners); Ex parte Martin, 13 Ark. 198 (1853) (in a levee case bearing some
similarity to Cubbins, the Arkansas Supreme Court wrote, "The right of eminent domain is inherent in the government or sovereign power, and equally so is, or ought to be, in every government
of laws, the vested right to his property in the citizen; and the right of eminent domain means that,
when the public necessity or common good requires it, the citizen may be forced to sell his
property for its fair value. The duty of making compensation may be regarded as a law of natural
justice .... "); see also Carson v. St. Francis Levee Dist., 27 S.W. 590 (Ark. 1894) (again asserting the right of eminent domain in similar circumstances).
127. White, indeed, made short work of the plaintiff's effort to see the levees as "reclamation." Cubbins, 241 U.S. at 368-69. The Mississippi River valley had become filled with a "great
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A further question, however, is raised by White's use of foreign
sources and argument: Why did White's colleagues go along with an opinion crafted from French commentaries on the Code Napoleon when American precedents pointing in the other direction were at hand and argued
before the Court? Was his argument really so weak on the case law that he
was compelled in this direction? Perhaps they did so because of the serious
nature of the policies at stake. The levee system had to be sustained. Failure
to do so would destroy the commercial value of the lower Mississippi. And
neither Court nor Congress was inclined to provide compensation for those
whose losses might be deemed speculative or not directly related to an actual governmental taking. The interests at stake were very large. White's
reliance on Roman law provided the necessary conceptual apparatus to arrive at a result that must have met with general approval, even in the face of
strong contrary case law and judicial precedent. White's use of Roman law,
furthermore, helped him to claim for the outcome he desired the mantle of
antiquity and universality. The learning of ancient Rome and the best lights
of the Continent concurred in allowing the construction of protective barriers without the need to pay compensation to landowners adversely affected.
In this wayan open path for commercial development was secured.
C.

Cunnius v. Reading School District128

Coffin and Cubbins were not the only· cases in which White appealed
to Roman law as a source of universal principle for the resolution of pressing cases. Cunnius v. Reading School District presented a similar case. 129
Cunnius involved what might today seem like an odd and rather inconsequential legal fiction-the presumption of death. But a century or more
ago, in a highly mobile America still expanding westward at an inexorable
rate, in a day before birth certificates and easily traceable identifications,
the presumption of death must have played a more important role. Certainly, a quick review of databases suggests that presumption of death cases
appeared with some regularity in reported decisions. 130 A revised and expanded version of John Bouvier's Institutes of American Law summarized
the learning on the subject as it stood in the latter half of the nineteenth
century:
When a person has been absent for a long time, unheard from, the
law will presume him to be dead: it has been adjudged, that after
population." Id. at 368. At stake were "its farms, its villages, its towns, its cities, its schools, its
colleges, its universities, its manufactories, its network of railroads, some of them transcontinental
...." Id. Plaintiff's contention, White asserted, was "at war with" the plans of the affected state
governments and Congress itself. Id. at 369.
128. 98 U.S. 458 (1905).
129. Id.
130. A search of the LexisNexis database of reported decisions prior to May 30, 1905, when
the Cunnius case was decided, indicates approximately 400 reported decisions.
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twenty-five years; twenty years; in another case, sixteen years;
fourteen years; twelve years; and seven years; the presumption of
death arises. It seems to be agreed, that after an absence of seven
years, without being heard from, the presumption of death is sufficient to treat the absentee's property as if he were dead; though,
like every other presumption, this may be rebutted by showing
that the absentee is alive. 131
The presumption of death might be expected to work well where the
absent party actually was dead or had at least taken up a new life and livelihood far from his original home and family with no intention of returning.
Reported cases, however, demonstrate the difficulties that arose where the
party presumed to be deceased returned home only to find that he or she
had in fact been prematurely declared dead by competent authority and that
all sorts of unfortunate legal consequences flowed from this
determination. 132
At issue in Cunnius was a state statute that made certain property arrangements upon a determination that a party gone from a jurisdiction for a
long time should be presumed dead. The statute permitted one entitled to
take under the state's estate laws to petition the state's orphans' court for
letters of administration in cases where an absentee had not been heard
from in seven years, thus initiating the process of probating the absentee's
estate. 133 The statute required the local registrar of wills to post notice of
the impending proceeding and, where no response was forthcoming, authorized letters of administration to be issued to those entitled to receive
them.134 The estate might be distributed under such circumstances because
the absentee was presumed dead and the property was accordingly subject
to the laws of descent and distribution.
The plaintiff, Margaret Cunnius, domiciled in Reading, Pennsylvania,
owned the right to lifetime income from a piece of property situated in that
town. 135 Although legal title to the property passed to the Reading, Pennsylvania school district, Cunnius continued to retain the right to income at
the time of her disappearance from Pennsylvania in April 1888. 136 In
131. John Bouvier, Institutes of American Law vol. 1,234 (Daniel A. Gleason ed., rev. ed.,
Little, Brown & Co. 1880). Simon Greenleaf treats the presumption of death as a matter for the
law of evidence. In the case of an absentee, there is a presumption of life for the first seven years
of the person's absence, but the presumption shifts to one of death after that point in time, and the
burden of proof is placed on the one seeking to establish that the absentee remains alive. Simon
Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence vol. 2, 280-81 (Edward Avery Harriman ed., 16th
rev. ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1899).
132. See e.g. Beam v. Copeland, 14 S.W. 1094 (Ark. 1890) (estate settlement); N.Y. Life Ins.
Co. v. Holck, 151 P. 916 (Colo. 1915) (insurance settlement); Williams v. Williams, 23 N.W. 110
(Wis. 1885).
133. Cunnius, 198 U.S. at 458-59.
134. Id. at 459.
135. Id. at 460.
136. !d. at 461.
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March, 1897, nearly nine years later, her son, who remained in Reading,
petitioned for letters of administration on the basis of his mother's presumed death and claimed as part of his mother's estate the accrued interest
from 1888 to 1897.137 A year later, in 1899, Margaret reappeared, having in
the meantime resided in Sacramento, California, where she had remarried. 138 She now sought payment of the accrued interest from the school
district. 139 The school district raised the statute as a defense to payment. 140
Cunnius responded by challenging the constitutionality of the statute under
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 141
Caleb Bieber represented Cunnius in the United States Supreme Court.
The plaintiff, he asserted, "was deprived of her property without due process of law."142 At stake, he continued, were no great interests or policies
that required vindication at the expense of his client. All that was on the
table were the mere private rights of one individual: "If her departure from
Pennsylvania and her omission to demand her arrearages for a period of
eleven years worked an injury to anyone, it was to herself alone, and not to
any public right such as would bring this case within the police powers of
the State."143
Cmmius was under no obligation to remain in Pennsylvania. 144 Free to
come and go as she pleased, Bieber asserted, she should not lose title to
eleven years of accrued income and interest merely because she delayed in
claiming it. The only proper obstacle to her claim was the statute of limitations barring her claim, and the statute had not yet run. 145 Bieber cautioned
the Court not to engage in large abstractions about the authority and power
of the state over its courts. 146 "[T]he real point at issue," Bieber asserted, "is
137. ld.
138. ld.
139. ld. It seems from the reported case that Cunnius did not bring suit against her son. Perhaps the son had already spent the income owing to Cunnius; perhaps also Cunnius felt obliged by
ties of kinship to leave her son out of the litigation.
140. ld. at 461-62.
141. [Als she was alive when the proceedings for administration were taken in the state
court, those proceedings and the law which authorized them were repugnant to the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. She, moreover, contended, even
although there was power in the state to provide by law for the administration of the
property of an absentee, the particular law in question was repugnant to the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution, as it did not provide for adequate notice, and because
the law failed to furnish the necessary safeguards to give it validity.
ld. at 462.
142. Cunnius, 198 U.S. at 462.
143. Id. at 463.
144. ld.
145. ld. at 462.
146. "To decide abstractly whether a State can by a statute clothe its courts with certain powers would not be to the point, because the same act of assembly may be valid as to some persons
and the reverse as to others." ld. at 464.
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the effect of the operation of those powers on the rights of the party before
the court."147
Frederick W. Nicolls, a Pennsylvania appellate advocate of some regional stature but whose only appearance in the United States Supreme
Court was in Cunnius, preferred to focus the Court's attention on the power
of the legislature: "The legislature can make a valid grant of jurisdiction to
its courts over any legitimate subject matter, provided the subsequent steps
be according to law. Such a grant of authority the Pennsylvania assembly
directly conveyed by the act [in question]."148
Nicolls's argument, of course, begged the question raised in Bieber's
brief for appellant: Was the exercise of the state's authority legitimate with
respect to Cunnius? Nicolls asserted that it was but he made no concomitant
effort to prove his point. Nicolls instead asserted that, contrary to Bieber's
claim, large public interests were implicated by presumption of death statutes: "The grant to a court of jurisdiction over the estates of those who by
reason of a long absence are probably dead would seem a highly beneficial,
and, if the process were proper, a legal and rational, exercise of legislative
discretion."149 Decisions of American tribunals had sustained similar statutes. The most powerful of Nicolls's precedents was Arndt v. Griggs,150
which spoke directly of "[t]he power of the state to regulate the tenure of
real property . . . and the rules of its descent, and the extent to which a
testamentary disposition of it may be exercised by its owners, [as] undoubted."151 Nicolls thus sidestepped Bieber's challenge to the legitimacy
of the state's actions with respect to Cunnius by focusing on the public
necessity of ensuring that title to real estate passed seamlessly in accord
with the law of estates and trusts.
The Supreme Court handed down judgment in favor of the Reading
school district. Once again, one sees a familiar pattern at work in White's
opinion, written for a unanimous Court. After a one-paragraph nod in the
direction of American case law, 152 White reviewed the argument of plaintiff's counsel that the statute was unconstitutiona1. 153 In addition to summarizing some of the material quoted above regarding the facts of the case and

147. ld.
148. ld. at 465.
149. ld. at 466.
150. 134 U.S. 316 (1890).
151. ld. at 321. The other two cases cited by Nicolls were: Roller v. Holley, 176 U.S. 398
(1900), which similarly, though more broadly, asserted that "[the state] has control over property
within its limits," id. at 404; and Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. 336 (1850), asserting "[t]he
property of an individual is SUbject, in a certain sense, to the law of the State in which it is
situated," id. at 349.
152. Cunnius, 198 U.S. at 467-68.
153. ld. at 468.
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the arguments of counsel,154 White found pertinent to his opinion the strong
defense of individual rights made by plaintiff's counsel:
In a word, the case before the court is one in which the private
property of one person was, without her knowledge or consent,
transferred to another who in reality had no shadow of a right to
it, by virtue of an ex parte proceeding of which the owner had no
lawful notice. Is it possible that such a manifest infringement of
the fundamental and inherent rights which belong to every person
in the use and enjoyment of his private property can be construed
to be due process of law?155
White, however, did not accept this statement as a proper summary of
the issues before the Court; rather, he immediately perceived in this line of
argument a "challenge [to] the authority of the State,"156 which he accordingly sought to put down. Plaintiff's counsel, White asserted, had not only
claimed that the state's failure to provide notice amounted to a deprivation
of due process of law, but made the more radical claim that "there was a
complete want of [State] power to do SO."157
White addressed the question of state authority first. It is in this part of
his analysis that a modem reader finds, once again, repeated and sustained
recurrence to the works of civilian writers. "The question," as White understood it, "was not the wisdom of the statute, but whether it was so beyond
the scope of municipal government as to amount to a want of due process of
law."158 He thought the "solution of this inquiry" lay in understanding the
authority of the state over the regulation of wills and estates. 159 White eschewed an abstract analysis of the problem. 160 . Rather, he asserted, he
wished to examine empirically the question whether governments have actually taken the measures challenged by plaintiff. 161 In a sense, his goal was
deliberately comparative. If jurisdictions at widely varying times and
places-not only American but foreign also-have claimed the authority
challenged by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's argument must fail. 162
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

[d. (quoting material found at supra n. 143 and accompanying text).
[d. (quoting brief of plaintiff's counsel).
[d.
[d.
[d. at 469.
[d.

160. "We do not pause to demonstrate, by original reasoning, that the right to regulate concerning the estate or property of absentees is an attribute, which, in its very essence, must belong
to all governments .... " [d.
161. "[W]e propose rather to test the question by ascertaining how far such authority has been
deemed a proper governmental attribute in all times and under all conditions." [d.
162. If it be found that an authority of that character has ever been treated as belonging
to government and embraced in the right to protect and foster the well-being and order
of society, it must follow that that which has at all times and places been conceded to be
within the power of government, cannot, in reason, be said to be so beyond the scope of
governmental authority that the exertion of such a power must be held to be a want of
due process of law.
[d.
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To resolve this question, White immediately turned to the teaching of
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century French jurists working in the Romanist
tradition. 163 To be sure, White conceded the classical Roman law, and even
its more recent civilian adaptations, was not well developed in its treatment
of an absentee's estate. 164 White, however, found value in the works of two
French Romanists whose writings stood as evidence for the state of civilian
jurisprudence on the subject. Charles-Bonaventure-Marie Toullier
(1752-1835) did nothing more than recommend the need to balance conflicting interests. It is true, Toullier asserted, that prolonged absence might
interrupt or suspend civil rights, but he also indicated that there was a need
to protect and conserve the rights of persons legitimately living away from
the jurisdiction. 165 Alexandre Duranton (1783-1866), a second source consulted by White, merely called attention to the failure of classical Roman
law to develop a body of law "on the subject of absence" (au sujet des
absens) and speculated that this lacuna was the result of the ancient Roman
tendency to regard anyone taken captive in battle to be accounted as civilly
dead. 166
These sources were hardly strong support fot' White's thesis that it was
within the scope of governmental power to provide for the distribution of
estates in presumption of death cases. Indeed, standing alone, they might be
read as supporting a conclusion that the law was barely developed at all in
this area.
White, however, followed these texts with an analysis of the Code Napoleon, especially as explicated by Demolombe. 167 Demolombe, White
noted, "expounds the fundamental conceptions from which the power of
government on the subject is derived";
Three characters of interest invoke a necessity for legislation concerning this difficult and important subject. First. The interest of
the person himself who has disappeared. If it is true that generally
speaking every person is held at his own peril to watch over his
own property, nevertheless the law owes a duty to protect those
who from incapacity are unable to direct their affairs. It is upon
this principle of public order that the appointment of tutors to
minors or curators to the insane rests. It is indeed natural to presume that a person who has disappeared, if he continues to exist,
is prevented from returning by some obstacle stronger than his
own will, and which, therefore, places him in the category of an
incapable person, whose interest it is the duty of the law to pro163. [d.
164. [d.

165. Charles-Bonaventure-Marie Toullier, Le Droit Civil Fra/U;ais vol. I, liv. I, titre IV, Des
AbseilS, § 379, 247 (16th ed., Paris 1846); cf Cunnius, 198 U.S. at 469.
166. Alexandre Duranton, Cours de Droit Frallr;ais Suivant Ie Code Civil vol. I, liv. I, titre IV,
Des AbseilS, § 384, 305-06 (3d ed., Paris 1834).
167. CUllnius, 198 U.S. at 470.
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tect. And it is for this reason that the provisions as to absence in
the code are placed in the chapter treating of the status of persons
because the absentee, in the legal sense, is a person occupying a
peculiar legal status. Second. The duty of the lawmaker to consider the rights of third parties against the absentee, especially
those who have rights which would depend upon the death of the
absentee. Third. Finally, the general interest of society which may
require that property does not remain abandoned without some
one representing it and without an owner.... 168
Embedded within this statement of the state's solicitude and authority
over the property of an absentee is a robust conception of the state's authority to see to the necessities of public welfare. 169 The state is empowered, on
this reading of the western political tradition, to see to the needs of those
incapable of caring for themselves and to look after the "general interest of
society," understood as the need to protect not only the liberty interests of
the individual property owner, but the social need that ownership be clearly
identifiable and that the responsibility for the care and upkeep of the property in question be properly allocated. 170
Caleb Bieber, in his argument for the plaintiff, had put forward a
rights-based argument deeply grounded in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century conceptions of robust individual economic rights and minimalist state authority.l71 Herbert Spencer, William Graham Sumner, and other
late nineteenth-century political theorists had come to view the state as having no power beyond its responsibility to maximize and secure the freedom
of the individual, especially in the economic sphere. l72 Bieber's sharp dis168. ld. at 470-71.
Trois SOltes d'interet appelaient sur cette situation difficile et importante toute law solIicitude de la loi:
1° L'interet de la personne eIIe-meme qui a disparu. S'il est vrai qu'en general, chacun
est tenu de veiIIer, a ses riosquet et perils, au soin de ses affaires, la loi doit pourtant au
protection a I'incapacite de ceux qui ne peuvent pas gouverner eux-memes leur fortune.
C'est sur ce principe d'ordre public qu'est fondee la tuteIIe des mineurs et des interdits;
or, il est naturel de presumer que la personne qui a disparu, si elIe existe encore, est
retenue et empechee par quelque obstacle plus fort que sa volunte;' donc, il faut des lors
la mettre au nombre des incapables, dont la 10i protege eIIe-meme les interets. Et voila
bien ce qui explique la place de ce titre dans Ie livre Ier du Code Napoleon, consacre a
I'etat des personnes; e'est qu'en effet, I'absence, ainsi entendue, constitue une modification dans I'etat meme de la personne (citation omitted);
2°. L'interet des tiers, de ceux-Ia surtout qui ont des droits auxquels Ie deces prouve de
I'absent donnerait ouverture;
3° Enfin, I'interet general de la societe, qui exige que les biens ne restent pas trop
longtemps abandonnes, sans representant et sans maItre ....
Demolombe, supra n. 96, at vol. II, liv. I, titre IV, Exposition Generale, 2-3.
169. Cunnius, 198 U.S. at 470-71.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 462-64.
172. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court, 104 Yale
L.J. 2309 (1995); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40
Stan. L. Rev. 379 (1988).
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tinction between private and public (Cunnius's failure to claim her accrued
income harmed no one but herself, he alleged) was simply one manifestation of this way of conceiving of the state's authority over the person. 173
Bieber's argument stood in sharp contrast with White's claims on behalf of
the state's authority, as evidenced by his use of the lengthy quotation from
Demolombe. It is not surprising, perhaps, that White engaged in a vigorous
and sustained effort to refute the plaintiff's effort to limit state power in
presumption of death cases. White clearly viewed the Pennsylvania statute,
in short, as nothing more than a legitimate exercise of the state's police
power. 174
This minimalist understanding of the state's authority over the freedom
of the person would have its apotheosis in Lochner v. New York, decided in
April 1905, in the same Supreme Court term as Cunnius and handed down
only five weeks before the Cunnius opinion. 175 It should come as no surprise, perhaps, to learn that White, with his more robust conception of the
powers of the state to see to the general social welfare, sided with the dissenters in Lochner. Joining the dissenting opinion of the elder John Marshall Harlan, White assented to the proposition that liberty of contract might
"be subjected to regulations designed and calculated to promote the general
welfare or to guard the public health, the public morals, or the public
safety."176 Although the issues implicated by Lochner were very different
from Cunni us, there was present in both cases a strong understanding of the
right and responsibility of the state to see to the common good. And in each
case, Justice White was prepared to align himself with the state as guarantor
of the public welfare.
III.

CONCLUSION

This study of Edward Douglass White's use of Roman law as a ground
of decision in constitutional cases raises important questions about juristic
conceptions of sources of law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. This is not the venue, however, for exploring such a large but
compelling theme. I hope to return to this question in an expanded, booklength treatment of White and his contemporaries in the 1890s to the 1920s.
What I should like to focus on in my conclusion is the relationship of
this study with the larger theme of the symposium: American Exceptionalism. It has been a widely held assumption of common lawyers since at least
the days of Sir Edward Coke that the common law was a repository of
173. Cunnius, 198 U.S. at 462-64.
174. [d. at 469. White thus found it an easy matter as well to determine that the process used
to terminate Cunnius's right to receive her payments was constitutional. A seven-year waiting
peliod, and a procedure hedged in with notice requirements, sufficed to satisfy White's understanding of the requirements of the Due Process Clause. [d. at 476-77.
175. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
176. [d. at 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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juristic principle and wisdom of unique, almost transcendent, significance.
England was a chosen nation, on this understanding of the English legal
past, and her law was similarly divinely blessed and authorized.
This attitude of almost contemptuous superiority deeply colors commonly held assumptions about the role of foreign law in contemporary judicial decision making, as the introduction of this paper makes clear. In a
sense, this air of superiority reflects larger, pernicious currents of thought
coursing through contemporary American culture . .The twin-born evils of
triumphalism and provincialism are today detectible in many corners of
American society. This paper suggests that such a sense of superiority did
not invariably characterize American constitutional thought. Indeed, Western constitutionalism was once seen as a unity. The American constitutional
experiment was accordingly understood as a recent participant in a tradition
that extended back in time to the Middle Ages, indeed, to the ancient world
itself. Edward Douglass White fully appreciated this reality.

